Picture-perfect Quantum Key Distribution by Kissinger, Aleks et al.
Picture-perfect Quantum Key Distribution
Aleks Kissinger1, Sean Tull2, and Bas Westerbaan1
1Institute for Computing and Information Sciences, Radboud University Nijmegen
2Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
We provide a new way to bound the se-
curity of quantum key distribution using
only two high-level, diagrammatic features
of quantum processes: the compositional
behavior of complementary measurements
and the essential uniqueness of purifica-
tion. We begin by demonstrating a proof
in the simplest case, where the eavesdrop-
per doesn’t noticeably disturb the chan-
nel at all and has no quantum memory.
We then show how this approach extends
straightforwardly to account for an eaves-
dropper with quantum memory and the
presence of noise.
1 Introduction
Traditionally in cryptography, parties use pre-
shared keys to communicate securely. In 1976
Diffie and Hellman introduced the first key agree-
ment protocol that allows two parties, say Alice
and Bob, to securely establish a key over an in-
secure channel [14]. There are two caveats to its
security. First, it’s an unauthenticated key agree-
ment protocol,1 and second, its security hinges on
the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms.
Famously, Shor showed in 1994 [28] that a (large-
scale stable) quantum computer is able to calcu-
late discrete logarithms with ease, breaking Diffie
and Hellman’s original scheme.
There are other key agreement protocols whose
security is based on mathematical problems
which are believed to be difficult, even for quan-
tum computers. An example is NewHope [3, 7].
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1An attacker Eve that can intercept and modify all
communication between Alice and Bob, can simply im-
personate Bob and perform all the steps Bob would. Now
Alice thinks she established a shared key with Bob, where
in reality she established a shared key with Eve.
Such schemes form part of the program of post-
quantum cryptography [6].
On the other hand Bennett and Brassard pro-
posed a completely different unauthenticated key
agreement protocol, now called BB84 [5], whose
security is not based on a mathematical prob-
lem, but on physical assumptions on quantum
mechanical systems. In this protocol Alice needs
to be able to send Bob qubits. In most implemen-
tations, like [31], this is done by sending photons
over a fiber optic cable, where the qubits are en-
coded in the polarization of the photons. After
BB84 other variations have been proposed, no-
tably E91 [15], and they are all indiscriminately
referred to as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).
In their original paper, Bennett and Brassard
give a short argument for the security of BB84.
Feeling this proof was not satisfactory, subse-
quent authors have proposed more meticulous
proofs, for instance [22]. However, this added
rigor came at the cost of complexity, prompting
Shor and Preskill to publish a ‘simple proof’ [29].
This did not settle the matter: many subsequent
publications have appeared on the security of
BB84 and its variants, differing not only in lev-
els of rigor vs. simplicity, but also in the physi-
cal assumptions and the efficiency of the proto-
col itself (e.g. qubits required per bit of shared
key) [2, 4, 16, 19–21, 23–26].
The present paper contributes another proof
to the mix, whose primary aim is simplicity. It
is quite different from those that came before,
in that we adopt a purely graphical notation
and rely on techniques which arose in categor-
ical quantum mechanics [1] and the diagram-
matic approach to quantum theory [11]. We will
show that two high-level features of quantum
processes–namely the behavior of complemen-
tary measurements under composition [10] and
the essential uniqueness of purification of quan-
tum channels [9]–suffice to show that there exists
no quantum process with which an eavesdropper
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can undetectably extract information about Al-
ice and Bob’s shared key.
We begin by briefly reviewing the graphical
notation for quantum processes, including de-
pictions of purification and complementary mea-
surements. In Section 3, we describe a version of
BB84 in this notation and give a one-line version
of a proof of correctness which already appears in
the literature [11, 13], but makes the (unreason-
ably) strong assumption that Eve is only allowed
to measure and re-prepare in the Z and X bases.
Our first main result removes this assumption,
allowing Eve to perform any quantum process to
(attempt to) extract information from Alice and
Bob’s channel:
Φ
Alice
Bob Eve...
...
We then formulate the condition that Eve’s chan-
nel remains undetected by means of two equa-
tions, corresponding to the cases where Alice and
Bob’s measurement choices agree:
=Φ =Φ
Using the behavior of complementary measure-
ments, we show that this implies that Eve’s chan-
nel separates:
= ρ
Bob Eve...
Φ
Alice ... Alice ...
Bob ... Eve
While already much more general than previ-
ous graphical proofs, this still makes two very
strong assumptions. First, it assumes that Eve
performs the same process each time Alice and
Bob use their channel. Second, it assumes all
equalities are exact, so it offers no guarantees in
the presence of noise.
We remove the first limitation in Section 4
by allowing Eve to maintain an arbitrarily large
quantum memory between usages of the chan-
nel, and show that the separation argument still
holds. We remove the second limitation in Sec-
tion 5 by showing the same graphical proof from
Section 3 goes through, thanks to the continuity
properties of purification and diagram rewriting,
if we replace equality by -closeness in the com-
pletely bounded norm (written ‘ · · · ε=
cb
· · · ’). This
enables us to give a security bound for the QKD
protocol comparable to the one suggested in [17].
In particular, the fact that Eve’s process disturbs
the channel very little can be formulated as:
ε=
cbΦ
ε=
cbΦ
This implies that Eve’s process is within N
√
 of
a separable one:
N
√
ε=
cb
Φ ρ
for some constant N depending only on the di-
mension of Alice and Bob’s system.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we will use string di-
agram notation for linear maps and channels.
[11] Systems are depicted as wires and maps as
boxes. To make it clear whether we are work-
ing with linear maps between Hilbert spaces or
completely positive maps (CP-maps), we will de-
pict finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces H,K, . . . as
thin wires and the associated spaces of operators
B(H),B(K), . . . as thick wires.
A linear map V : H → K and CP-map
Φ: B(H) → B(K) (for Hilbert spaces H,K) are
depicted respectively as:
V
H
K
Φ
B(H)
B(K)
We omit wire labels if they are irrelevant or clear
from context. Compositions of maps is depicted
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by plugging boxes together vertically:
V ◦ U =:
U
V
H
K
L
Ψ ◦ Φ =:
Φ
B(H)
B(K)
Ψ
B(L)
and tensor products by putting boxes side-by-
side:
U⊗V =: U
H
H′
V
K′
K
Φ⊗Ψ =: Φ
B(H)
B(H′)
Ψ
B(K′)
B(K)
Similarly, maps between tensor products such as
U : H → K ⊗ L or Φ: B(H) → B(K) ⊗ B(L)
are depicted as boxes with multiple input/output
wires:
H
LK
U
U : H → K ⊗ L
B(H)
B(L)B(K)
Φ
Φ : B(H)→ B(K ⊗ L)
where we identify B(H) ⊗ B(K) ∼= B(H ⊗ K).
Identity linear maps/CP-maps are represented as
‘plain wires’:
1H =: H 1B(H) =: B(H)
since U ◦ 1H = 1K ◦U = U and similarly for CP-
maps. The trivial system C is depicted as ‘no
wire’, since H ⊗ C ∼= H and B(H) ⊗ C ∼= B(H).
Regarding vectors as linear maps v : C→ H and
positive operators as CP-maps ρ : C→ B(H), we
can depict vectors |ψ〉 ∈ H and quantum states
in ρ ∈ B(H) respectively as maps from 0 to 1
wire:
ψ
H
ρ
B(H)
Similarly, we can depict linear functionals
〈ψ| : H → C and CP-maps of the form
e : B(H)→ C as maps from 1 to 0 wires:
ψ
H
e
B(H)
2.1 Purification
The linear map that sends ρ ∈ B(H) to its trace
is a CP-map Tr : B(H) → C, which we draw as
a ‘ground’ symbol:
Tr =
Using this notation, we can express the prop-
erty of a CP-map being trace-preserving as fol-
lows:
Φ =
Furthermore, any linear map U : H → K in-
duces a CP-map Û : B(H)→ B(K) via:
Û(ρ) = U ρU † (1)
We call a CP-map pure if it is of the form of (1).
We call this method of turning a linear map into
a pure CP-map doubling.
An important theorem about CP-maps is that
any CP-map can be represented in an essentially
unique manner, by means of a pure CP-map and
the trace.
Theorem 2.1 (Stinespring / purification,
[8, 30]). For any completely positive map
Φ: B(H)→ B(K) there is a Hilbert space L and
linear map V : H → K ⊗ L with
Φ = V̂ (2)
Moreover, for any (other) linear map V ′ : H →
K⊗L satisfying (2), there is a unitary U : L→ L
such that:
=
V
V ′
U
2.2 Spiders and decoherence
To each orthonormal basis (ONB) {|i〉} of a
(finite-dimensional) Hilbert space H, we asso-
ciate a family of linear maps called spiders as
follows:
n
m :=
...
...
n
m
=
∑
i
|i . . . i〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〈i . . . i|︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
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where a spider with zero legs is a complex number
D, the dimension of the Hilbert space.
Different ONBs induce different spiders, and
furthermore an ONB is uniquely fixed by its fam-
ily of spiders [12]. Adjacent spiders associated
with the same ONB fuse together. That is, for
k ≥ 1, we have:
...
...
...
...
...
m2
n1
k
m1
n2
=
n1 + n2
m1 +m2
...
...
(3)
We write the doubled spiders as follows:
n
m :=
...
...
7→ n̂m :=
...
...
These CP-maps, which satisfy the same fusion
law, are called quantum spiders. Examining the
concrete expression:
n̂
m(ρ) := ( nm) ρ ( nm)†
=
∑
ij
|i . . . i〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〈i . . . i|︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
ρ |j . . . j〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
〈j . . . j|︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
we see that:
Tr ( n̂m(ρ)) =
∑
i
〈i . . . i|︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
ρ |i . . . i〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
Hence, such a map is trace-preserving whenever
it has exactly one input:
...
= (4)
One derived map which will be particularly
important in the sequel is the decoherence map,
which arises from tracing out one output of 2̂1:
d = :=
Concretely:
d (ρ) =
∑
i
|i〉〈i| ρ |i〉〈i|
That is, it projects a positive matrix written with
respect to the ONB {|i〉} ⊂ H to its diagonal
entries:
ρij 7→ δijρii
The fact that this CP-map is trace-preserving fol-
lows from (4):
= =
(4)
and idempotence from spider-fusion and (4):
= =
(4)
= = =
If dim(H) = n, decoherence gives a rank-n pro-
jector in the n2-dimensional space B(H), hence
we can split this projector using the following lin-
ear maps:
m =
B(H)
H
e =
B(H)
H
where:
m (|i〉〈j|) := δij |i〉 e (|i〉) := |i〉〈i|
Then we have:
= and = (5)
Treating B(H) itself as a Hilbert space us-
ing the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product 〈U |V 〉 :=
Tr (U †V ), one can easily verify that m =
(e )†.
These maps have a straightforward operational
interpretation which will play a role in the fol-
lowing sections. The first, m , sends a quan-
tum state to a classical probability distribution,
whose entries are the Born rule probabilities as-
sociated with an ONB measurement of {|i〉}:
m (ρ) =
〈1| ρ |1〉...
〈n| ρ |n〉

Hence, we can think of it as a map from a quan-
tum space B(H) to a classical space of probabil-
ity distributions in H (treated simply as a vec-
tor space), representing the act measuring in the
given basis.
4
quantum
classical
Conversely, e sends a classical value (or dis-
tribution over classical values) to an encoding of
that value as a quantum state:
quantum
classical
Hence, it represents the act of encoding a classical
value with respect to an ONB of quantum states.
With these interpretations in mind, the left
equation in (5) gives an operational reading for
decoherence. Namely, it arises from measuring a
quantum system, followed by re-preparing it in
the same basis.
Furthermore, certain spiders take on a spe-
cial meaning as operations on classical systems.
Namely,
=
∑
i
|ii〉〈i| (6)
is the process which copies a classical value,
=
∑
i
〈i| (7)
is deleting (a.k.a. marginalisation), and
1
D =
1
D
∑
i
|i〉 (8)
is the uniform probability distribution. Note that
(7) and (8) are the classical analogue to the
trace and the maximally mixed state, respec-
tively. Since (6) is a cloning (i.e. broadcasting)
operation, it has no quantum analogue.
The final spider-derived map we will use is a
non-demolition measurement :
:=
This map captures the process where we perform
an ONB measurement (which produces classical
data) but also leave the quantum system intact.
Alternatively, we can read the RHS above liter-
ally as performing a (demolition) measurement,
copying the measurement outcome, and using
one of the copies to re-prepare the quantum sys-
tem.
2.3 Complementary spiders
We can study the interaction of distinct ONBs
on the same Hilbert space by introducing distinct
families of spiders. From hence forth, we will fix
two ONBs {|zi〉}, {|xi〉} of a Hilbert space H of
dimension D, and let:
n
m :=
...
...
n
m
=
∑
i
|zi . . . zi〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〈zi . . . zi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
n
m :=
...
...
n
m
=
∑
i
|xi . . . xi〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
〈xi . . . xi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
Consequently, we let:
m (|zi〉〈zj |) := δij |zi〉 e (|zi〉) := |zi〉〈zi|
m (|xi〉〈xj |) := δij |xi〉 e (|xi〉) := |xi〉〈xi|
Two ONBs are said to be mutually unbiased or
complementary whenever any member of one ba-
sis gives equal probabilities to all outcomes of a
measurement with respect to the other, i.e. we
have |〈zi|xj〉|2 = 1D , for all i, j. We can also
express this property succinctly in terms of the
measurement/encoding maps associated with a
pair of spiders.
Theorem 2.2 ([11]). Two ONBs are mutu-
ally unbiased if and only if their measure-
ment/encoding maps satisfy the following equa-
tion:
= 1
D (9)
Proof. Precomposing the LHS of (9) with |zi〉
and post-composing with 〈xj | yields:
〈xj |m e |zi〉 = (e |xj〉)†(e |zi〉)
= Tr (|xj〉〈xj | |zi〉〈zi|) = |〈zi|xj〉|2
By definition of spiders, performing the same
pre- and post-composition on the RHS yields 1D ,
which completes the proof.
Rather than resorting to measurement and en-
coding maps, we can also express mutual unbi-
asedness directly in terms of spiders with the help
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of an additional linear map, called the antipode
associated with a pair of spiders:
:=s =
∑
ij
〈zi|xj〉 |xj〉〈zi|
Theorem 2.3 ([10]). Two ONBs are mutually
unbiased if and only if their associated spiders
satisfy the following equation:
= 1
D
s (10)
Proof. Follows similarly to the proof of Theo-
rem 2.2. Pre-composing the LHS of (10) with
|zi〉 and post-composing with 〈xj | yields:
〈xj | s |zi〉 〈xj |zi〉 = 〈zi|xj〉〈xj |zi〉 = |〈xj |zi〉|2
Whereas pre- and post-composing on the RHS
again yields 1D .
Remark 2.4. The two conditions for unbiased-
ness given by Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 are related
to each other via the (basis-dependent) isomor-
phism B(H) ∼= H ⊗H:∑
ij
ρij |zj〉〈zi| ∼←→
∑
ij
ρij |zi〉 ⊗ |zj〉
Since the above isomorphism is defined with re-
spect to the -basis, the map s corrects the -
spider to account for this basis-dependence:
∼←→ ∼←→
s
Remark 2.5. The map s is called an antipode
because equation (10) is the antipode law for a
Hopf algebra. If the spiders associated with a
pair of mutually unbiased bases satisfy the other
three Hopf algebra laws, they are called strongly
complementary bases, which are special mutu-
ally unbiased bases which always arise from finite
abelian groups via Fourier transform [11].
3 Key Distribution Protocol
Alice chooses a random bit and encodes this bit
as a qubit using either the Z or X basis with
equal probability. She sends the qubit to Bob.
Independently, Bob chooses to perform either a Z
or X basis measurement on the qubit he received,
again with equal probability. With probability
1/2 their choices agree and the bit is perfectly
transmitted:
=
Alice
Bob
=
Alice
Bob
Otherwise, Bob receives a random bit, with no
information conveyed:
= 1
D
Bob
Alice
= 1
D
Bob
Alice
To agree on a shared key with average size n, Al-
ice and Bob go through the previous routine 4n
times. Then Alice and Bob announce the bases
they used for encoding and measuring respec-
tively and discard those bits where the bases dis-
agree. On average 2n bits remain. To check for
trouble, Alice randomly picks n of the remaining
bits and announces their value to Bob. If there
is any mismatch on these check-bits, Alice and
Bob abort. If not, Alice and Bob are left with
(on average) n bits.
Suppose that an eavesdropper Eve intercepts a
transmitted qubit in attempt to extract informa-
tion. Eve does not know which basis Alice used to
encode her bit, so let us first assume Eve adopts
a naive strategy whereby she randomly decides
to perform a non-demolition measurement with
respect to Z or X.
Alice and Bob will ignore any bits for which
their basis choices differ, so we need only consider
the case where they match. If Alice and Bob
both choose Z, and Eve chooses (correctly) to
also measure in Z:
:= =
(5)
she indeed receives a perfect copy of Alice’s bit.
On the other hand, if she guesses wrong, and
measures X:
:= =
(9)
1
D2
=1
D2
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Eve and Bob both receive a random bit, com-
pletely uncorrelated to Alice’s original bit. Alice
and Bob’s communication will be similarly dis-
rupted when they both measure X but Eve mea-
sures Z. In a longer run, these disruptions will be
detected by Alice and Bob using the check-bits,
giving away Eve’s presence.
Now let us consider the case where Eve can
apply any operation to attempt to extract some
information about Alice’s bit. That is, show ap-
plies some quantum channel Φ: B(H) → B(H ⊗
E), where H is the Hilbert space of the qubit and
E is that of some other system possessed by Eve:
Φ
Alice
Bob Eve...
...
In order for Eve’s intervention to remain unde-
tected in either case where Alice and Bob’s mea-
surements agree, Eve’s channel must satisfy the
following equations:
=Φ =Φ (11)
We now prove that, in this scenario, Eve cannot
possibly extract any information. That is, her
channel separates.
Theorem 3.1. For any Φ satisfying (11) for
complementary ONBs / we have:
=Φ ρ
B(H)
B(H) B(E) B(H)
B(H)
B(E)
for some state ρ of B(E).
Proof. By precomposing measurement maps and
postcomposing encoding maps, we find
=Φ =Φ (12)
By purifying Φ, we can without loss of generality
assume that Eve’s map Φ is pure, say with Φ =
V̂ . The left-hand side of (12) states that:
V̂
=
ψ̂
= (13)
for any normalized pure state ψ of E ⊗ H. By
essential uniqueness of purification, we conclude
that:
V
ψ=
U
(14)
for some unitary U on H ⊗ E ⊗H. Hence:
V
ψ
=
U
(15)
Using the spider laws (3), it follows that:
V
=
V V
=
V
(16)
The same equations also hold for the gray spiders
with the same reasoning starting with the right-
hand side of (12). But together these imply that
V separates, since:
(3)
V
VV
(10)
1
D
= =
s
(16) V V(10) V (3)
1
D
1
D
===
s
(where for a qubit we have D = 2). Hence Φ
separates as well.
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The simple nature of the graphical proof makes
clear several immediate generalizations. Firstly,
the same protocol and proof may be applied ap-
ply whether Alice and Bob are sharing a qubit
or a qudit for arbitrary (finite) Hilbert space di-
mension D, on which Alice and Bob must simply
choose any pair of complementary orthonormal
bases.
4 Eavesdroppers with memory
A very strong assumption in the previous deriva-
tion was that Eve performs the same channel ev-
ery time in attempts to extra information from
Alice’s string of bits. Suppose now that Eve may
now vary her behavior depending on the qubits
she has received previously. That is, she may now
make use of a quantum memory that persists be-
tween individual steps of the protocol. Her chan-
nel is now of the form Φ: B(H⊗E)→ B(H⊗E),
with an extra input into which is passed the out-
put from the previous intercepted qubit. She ini-
tially prepares her auxiliary system in some state
ρ. Then Eve’s procedure, during n transmissions
between Alice and Bob, amounts to the channel
Φ′ : B(H⊗n)→ B(H⊗n ⊗ E) given by:
Φ
Φ
...
Φ
...
...
:=
ρ
...
...
Φ′
B(H) B(H)
B(H) B(H) B(H)
B(H) B(H) B(H) B(E)
B(H) B(H)B(E)B(H)
B(H)
(17)
(As Eve can keep a counter in E, this setting
is as general as if we would allow Eve a differ-
ent Φn : B(H ⊗ E) → B(H ⊗ E) for each trans-
mitted qubit.)
As before, for Eve’s interference to remain
completely undetected, we must have that:
=
...
Φ′
...
...
(18)
along with analogous equations for all of the re-
maining 2n − 1 variations of basis and position.
In particular the one for the first bit becomes:
Φ
...
=
ρ ...
The same equation holds for the gray spiders
also. From cancellativity of the tensor product,
we conclude that Φ◦ (id⊗ρ) satisfies the require-
ments of Theorem 3.1, and so separates as:
Φ
ρ
= ρ′
for some state ρ′ of B(E). Returning to the re-
quirement (18), the same argument again with
n− 1 instances of Φ and ρ′ replacing ρ shows that
Φ◦ (id⊗ρ′) itself separates. Repeating this argu-
ment inductively reveals that Φ itself separates,
and thus Eve again receives no information.
5 Noise-tolerance
The proofs we have just seen might be pleasing,
but they do not give us a priori confidence in
the security of QKD: it might be the case that
with only a minute disturbance, Eve might ex-
tract a lot of information. We will see in this
section that this is not the case: the equational
proof also leads to a polynomial bound on the
distance of Eve’s channel from a separable one
by the amount of disturbance. The key is an
approximate version of essential uniqueness of
purifications due to Kretschmann, Schlingemann
and Werner [17, 18]:
Theorem 5.1 (Continuity of Stinespring Dila-
tion). [17, Theorem 1] Let V1, V2 : A→ B⊗E be
linear maps. Then:
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inf
U
∥∥∥∥∥ −
V1
V2
U
∥∥∥∥∥
2
∞
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ −V̂1 V̂2
∥∥∥∥∥
cb
≤ 2 inf
U
∥∥∥∥∥ −
V1
V2
U
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
where the infima are taken over all unitaries
U : E → E.
Here ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the usual operator norm
and ‖ · ‖cb the completely bounded norm of super
operators which is defined via the sup-norm on
super-operators:
‖V ‖∞ := sup
‖ψ‖≤1
‖V ψ‖ ‖Φ‖∞ := sup
‖T‖≤1
‖Φ(T )‖∞
‖Φ‖cb := sup
n∈N
‖idMn ⊗ Φ‖∞
The operator norm (on operators) and cb-
norm (on super operators) satisfy the following
rules.
‖f ◦ g‖ ≤ ‖f‖ ‖g‖ ‖f ⊗ g‖ = ‖f‖ ‖g‖ ‖id‖ = 1
The regular sup-norm on super operators does
not satisfy the middle rule. For brevity, we will
write
V
ε= V ′ ⇔ ‖V − V ′‖∞ ≤ ε
T
ε=
cb
T ′ ⇔ ‖T − T ′‖cb ≤ ε.
The compositional rules for the operator norm
allow us to lift approximate equations between
sub-diagrams to those between full diagrams, us-
ing the rule:
V
ε= W =⇒ =
S
R
W
S
R
V
‖R‖‖S‖ε
(19)
Theorem 5.2 (Noise Tolerance). There is a con-
stant N , depending only on the dimension of Al-
ice and Bob’s system, such that whenever
ε=
cbΦ
ε=
cbΦ (20)
we have that
N
√
ε=
cb
Φ ρ (21)
for some state ρ of B(E).
Proof. From the upper bound of Theorem 5.1,
it suffices to prove that there is such a constant
N for which any purification V̂ of Eve’s channel
satisfies:
N
√
ε=V V1D (22)
This follows from the proof of Theorem 3.1, by
repeatedly applying the rule (19) to replace each
strict equation in the proof by an approximate
one. At each step one only picks up linear factors
from the norms of other maps featuring in each
diagram. Inspecting the proof, one can see that
these are independent of Eve’s system or channel.
In more detail, let V̂ be a purification of Eve’s
channel. Then the left hand side of (20) says
precisely that the two sides of (13) are within ε
in the completely bounded norm, for any such
pure state ψ. By Theorem 5.1, there is then a
unitary U such that the two sides of (14) are
within 2
√
ε. Applying two copies of 10 as in
(15), we obtain equation (15) up to 2
√
ε|| 10||2.
This ensures that (16) holds up to a constant
factor in
√
ε dependent only on the norms of the
n
m maps. Similarly so does the same equation
for the gray spider.
The final steps of the proof now follow just as
before. Again at each step we simply replace a
strict equation by one up to a constant factor in√
ε, dependent only on the white and gray spi-
ders, using the rule (19).
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Taking the distance of Eve’s channel from a
separable channel as a measure of how much in-
formation she can extra from Alice’s bit, we see
that, as expected, the amount of information is
bounded by how much Eve disturbs the commu-
nication between Alice and Bob.
We conclude this section with a few caveats:
1. The bound applies if the systems of Al-
ice, Bob and Eve can be modeled by finite-
dimensional Hilbert spaces and their inter-
action as a completely positive map be-
tween their tensor products. For other ap-
plications these assumptions are untenable,
see e.g. [33] and [27]. There is, however,
no clear indication that for quantum in-
formation arguments these assumptions are
invalid. Nonetheless it’s of interest how
far these arguments generalize. Interac-
tions between arbitrary (possibly infinite-
dimensional) von Neumann algebras admit
a Stinespring-like dilation [32], but no con-
tinuity result is known.
2. Like the proof in Section 3, the proof above
assumes Eve performs the same operation
every time. This should be extended to in-
corporate memory as in Section 4.
3. The random sampling (check-bits) on its
own does not guarantee the bound (20).
Renner solves the analogous problem with
some effort by showing the resulting com-
bined state of Alice, Bob and Eve may be
assumed to be approximately symmetric un-
der permutations of the bits in the run [24].
A similar method may apply here.
6 Outlook
We saw how to derive a bound on the security of
QKD using the diagrammatic behavior of com-
plementary observables and continuity of Stine-
spring. Whether the protocol ensures the as-
sumed bound (20) and how the conclusion (21) is
related to the more common quantities like mu-
tual information and the secret-key rate, we leave
open to future research.
In closing we note that, in the current lit-
erature, diagrammatic arguments have typically
only been used for exact reasoning about quan-
tum processes. Our proof of Theorem 5.2 sug-
gests a general strategy of using the rule (19)
to extend such exact diagrammatic arguments
to approximate ones. We call this technique ε-
bounded diagrammatic reasoning. It should be
applicable to many further quantum protocols,
allowing the intuitive diagrammatic approach to
quantum information theory developed in [11] to
be used to make physically reasonable and robust
arguments, such as required for security proto-
cols.
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